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The process of language acquisition has been a fascinating 
area of investigation for centuries. Learning this human system 
of communication separates us from the other members of the animal 
kingdom. The enormous nature of the task that confronts the very 
young language learning child and the surprising uniformity of the 
results in spite of great environmental differences has led 
researchers to agree that a certain amount of information about 
language must be genetically 'wired' into the human brain. There 
has been much speculation about the nature of phonological uni-
versals and syntactic universals, but relatively little work has 
been done with potential semantic universals. 
The language learning child is very perceptive. They have the 
cognitive ability to organize and interpret sensory input on the 
basis of their past experience or on the basis of a species specific 
innate capacity for first experiences. We must grant this concept 
of innate universal capacity for if we did not it would be impossible 
to explain how any initial organization of sensory input could 
happen. Conceptual notions would be acquired before their verbal 
expression, or language would have to be viewed as potential non-
sense. Eisenson (1984) suggested that perception implies an act 
of categorization according to which stimuli are sorted and given 
meaning. If one asks where the first category that allows the 
child to make additional categorizations comes from they are led 
to conclude that a normal child is born with some innate categories 
and then develops other categories as they mature. N. Chomsky 
(1980) not~d that the rate of vocabulary acquisition is so high 
at certain stages of life, and the precision and delicacy of the 
concepts acquired so remarkable, that it seems necessary to con-
clude that in some manner the conceptual system with which the 
lexical items are connected is already substantially in place. 
Slobin (1985) argued that children learning language approach 
the task with a prestructured 'semantic space' in which meaning 
and meaning clusters constitute a set of notions onto which 
functors and other grammatical constructions are intially mapped. 
The particular forms that are mapped will vary from language to 
language, but the basic meanings are constant. Bowerman (1985) 
agreed that children can spontaneously categorize objects,· events, 
and situations for purposes of linguistic expression. She also 
indicated that when children do form the categories they use 
meaning distinctions that are relevant for language, i.e. they 




Explanations or answers to questions about semantic universals 
have not been formulated to a great extent in the literature. The 
theory set forth in this paper addresses basic concerns about how 
children segment reality and assign labels for their earliest words, 
specifically, how a child begins to derive meaning from the language 
to which he or she has been exposed. At the outset verbal utterances 
come to have meaning for a child who has only a potential for acquir-
ing language, but as yet no language. In this elementary verbal 
stage it is impossible to ignore the child's cognitive ability. 
Somehow an object, event, or scene must be.associated with some 
name or label in the child's mind. The manipulation of objects 
leads to an understanding of 'thingness' and 'classes of events'. 
Later experiences lead to the categorizing of spatial, temporal, 
and action structures, all of which must precede the use of words 
for these concepts. The cognitive hypothesis suggests that children 
only can talk about what they already understand in some sense. 
This view forces one to have a rather rich interpretation for 
children's early words. 
Often children's first words communicate meanings beyond 
adult usage. The overly broad use of a word for a class of several 
referents, some of which fall outside the adult category for the 
same word, is referred to as overextension. Overextension has 
been discussed by Clark (1973), Bowerman (1978, 1980), Nelson 
(1978) and Barrett (1982) among others. These studies suggest 
that all children have an elementary semantic system which allows 
them to reference the world in a principled way. Clark classified 
a number of overextensions in children's speech. She found that 
the possible defining features were such characteristics as 
MOVEMENT, SHAPE, SIZE, SOUND, or TASTE. Children have used a word 
such as 'bird' with a first referent a sparrow to later refer to 
cows, dogs, cats, any animal moving; a word 'moon' with a first 
referent as the moon is later used to refer to cakes, round marks 
on a window,· writing on a window and in books, round shapes in 
books, tooling on leather book covers, round post marks, and the 
letter O; the word 'fly' with a first referent a fly later used 
to refer to specks of dirt, dust, all small insects, the child's 
own toes, and crumbs of bread; the word 'koko' with a first 
referent of a cock crowing later used for tunes played on a violin, 
piano, accordian, phonograph, all music, and a merry-go-round; and 
the word 'cola' with a first referent of chocolate later used for 
sugar, tarts, grapes, figs, and peaches. Similar processes occur 
in the acquisition of verbs and nouns; the child extracts a set 
of attributes from the actions or objects that are typically named 
by adults and then extends the words to other actions or objects 
that share one or more of those attributes. Only as he learns 
the names of more and more actions and objects does he limit their 
use to appropriate referents. 
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TABLE 1 contains the specification of the semantic primes 
suggested for the prestructured semantic space (using Slobin's 
term). It is difficult to get outside of the words of the 
language in order to establish a technique of scientific descrip~ 
tion, but these semantic primes refer to concepts and not to 
words. These primes, singly and in combination, provide the 
mechanism through which the child can segment his or her reality 
and eventually put labels on it. It is crucial that the child 
be able to extract these primes from the input speech of the 
adults in the child's environment. 
TABLE l. 
Semantic Primes 
1. SPACE (physical space) 19. ACTIVE (used in verbs) 
2. LIFE, VITALITY 20. POWER, ABILITY, POTENTIAL 
3. MOVEMENT 21. QUESTION 
4. LIGHT 22. THING, OBJECT 
5. (HU)MAN 23. BEING, EXISTENCE 
6. TIME 24. THIS 
7. MATTER, MATERIAL 25. RELATION 
8. SOUND 26. INSIDE, WITHIN 
9. MIND, SPIRIT 27. THROUGH, BY MEANS OF 
10. NEGATION 28. TOGETHER, WITH 
11. CONDITION 29. ABOVE, ON TOP 
12. SAME, EQUAL 30. TO(WARD) 
13. ROUND 31. FROM, OUT OF 
14. GOOD, POSITIVE 32. BEFORE, IN FRONT 
15. PART 33. ONE 
16. QUANTITY, NUMEROSITY 34. TWO 
17. SENSATION, FEELING 35. THREE 
18. QUALITY (used in adjectives) 
These primes are not listed in any order of importance. There is 
no hierarchy intended. To illustrate how these semantic primes 
function in forming the basis for early child vocabulary I·have 








LIFE l- I l' THING anima 
LIFE I 'food' 




LIGHT I I i h I 
SENSATION t--- s g t 
GOOD ~ LIGHT 'beauty 
SENSATION 
THIS 1- 'I' 
HUMAN 
LIGHT l 'd I 
TIME r- ay 
LIFE ~ 
THING 'domestic animal' 
TOGETHER 
LIFE ~ BY MEANS OF 'eat' 
ACTIVE 





GOOD ~ LIGHT I 'f I SENSATION beaut1 ul 
QUALITY 





TOGETHER I I I . SAME, EQUAL I I li id I 
MATTER J;: solid matter MATTER ~ qu 
(does not flow) 











SOUND I I i I 
QUALirYt"-- nosy 
NEGATION~ 
SOUND 'to be quiet' 
ACTIVE 
MIND l 'think' 
ACTIVE I 
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MOVEMENT f-










QUANTITY I I • I 
SPACE r---- size 
QUALITY! I 1 I 
LIGHT i---- co or 
SENSATION I I t f l' 
ACTIVE r-- o ee 
QUESTION J--'where?' SPACE 
QUESTION ~'what?' MATTER 
THIS ~'h I SPACE ere 
RELATION ~· h I SPACE w ere 
TOWARD t-- I • I 
INSIDE into 
TOGETHER ~'at' SPACE 
MOVEMENT 
~'to TOWARD come' 
ACTIVE 






SPACE 'big, large' 
QUALITY 
QUALITY I I SPACE r--- form, shape' 
TOGETHER ~ 
GOOD I I 
SENSATION to love 
ACTIVE 
QUESTION 1--- 'when?" TIME 
QUESTION t- 'who?' HUMAN 
THIS l-- I I TIME now 
RELATION 1---'who' HUMAN 
NEGATION J-- 'outside' INSIDE 




BEFORE I- 'b f I TIME e ore 
ONE ~ QUANTITY 'length' 
SPACE 
TWO ~ QUANTITY 'flat' 
SPACE 
ABOVE I ' 
MATTER r-- air 
SAME t EQUAL ~ 




IN FRONT I I 
MOVEMENT push 
ACTIVE 
INSIDE I- 'k 1 I MIND now edge 
INSIDE I I if' 
CONDITION .I. 
WILLIS 
QUANTITY 'l I ONE ~ 
SPACE ong 
QUALITY 




















With this set of semantic primes we can begin to see how 
children may relate to their world with their first words. I 
have presented illustrations of how these primes can work in 
combinations to form the initial semantic content of early 
child vocabulary. Overextension on the characteristics of 
movement, shape, sound, size, etc. are readily explained with 
this system., Cross cultural comparisons can be made directly. 
It is possible to understand how a language might have one 
word for anything that moves through the air, e.g. birds and 
airplanes. The child learning English maps the concept IN FRONT 
spatially and temporally onto the same phonetic form 'before'. 
In another culture these independent concepts might be realized 
with independent phonetic forms. One of the goals of this 
theory and the ongoing research with normal and nonnormal 
speakers is to make our understanding of the underlying semantic 
system of language more precise. This area of research has not 
received enough attention in language acquisition studies. As 
Bowerman states (198511314) .... 
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We therefore cannot be.satisfied with a theory 
that stops with the observation that meanings 
in some sense precede the acquisition of the 
forms that encode them. We need to go beyond 
this to determine how children work out the 
principles of semantic categorization that are 
functional in their language. Crosslinguistic 
comparisons will be essential to this effort in 
the future. Only by studying how children 
approach language systems that differ in their 
organization of what is, at a deep level, the 
'same' conceptual material can we begin to 
discover how language learners construct a 
sophisticated and language specific meaning 
system from their nonlinguistic understanding 
of daily experience. 
This set of semantic universals needs to be critically 
evaluated. The predictions need to be drawn out of these 
proposals and we need to determine whether counterexamples can 
be explained in some reasonable way. I look forward to future 
investigations of this fas~inating aspect of language acquisition. 
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